The Act of State Doctrine: Reconciling Justice and Diplomacy on a Case-by-Case Basis by Karelis, Kathleen
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 43 Number 5 Article 7 
5-1-1989 
The Act of State Doctrine: Reconciling Justice and Diplomacy on 
a Case-by-Case Basis 
Kathleen Karelis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kathleen Karelis, The Act of State Doctrine: Reconciling Justice and Diplomacy on a Case-by-Case Basis, 
43 U. Miami L. Rev. 1169 (1989) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol43/iss5/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
The Act of State Doctrine: Reconciling Justice
and Diplomacy on a Case-by-Case Basis
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1169
II. ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE ............................................ 1172
III. SETTING THE OUTSIDE BOUNDARIES OF THE DOCTRINE .................. 1175
A . The W illiam s Case ................................................ 1176
B. The O PEC Case .................................................. 1177
IV. THE FACTUAL SETTINGS OF THE CLAYCO AND ENVIRONMENTAL TECTONICS
C A SES .............................................................. 1179
A . The Clayco Case ................................................. 1179
B. The Environmental Tectonics Case .................................. 1180
V. RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS .......................................... 1182
A. Characterization of the Sovereign's Action ............................ 1182
B. Determination of the Sovereign's Motive .............................. 1186
1. GAUGING THE INTRUSIVENESS OF REVIEWING SOVEREIGN
M OTIVATION .................................................. 1186
2. CONTRASTING THE INTRUSIVENESS IN THE CLA YCO AND
ENVIRONMENTAL TECTONICS CASES ............................... 1190
C. The Commercial Nature of the Activity ............................... 1191
1. SETTING THE STAGE - THE DUNHILL CASE ...................... 1191
2. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON A COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION .............. 1194
3. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT'S DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY ..................... 1195
VI. RELIANCE ON EXECUTIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS ........................... 1197
V II. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 1201
I. INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine' is a principle of decision2 imposing
1. Section 443 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
expresses the act of state doctrine as follows:
(1) In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from
examining the validity of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own
territory, or from sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental character
done by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there.
(2) The doctrine set forth in Subsection (1) is subject to modification by an act
of Congress. See Section 444.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443
(1987).
2. In many cases, the act of state doctrine may be seen as a special rule of conflict of laws.
The normal choice of law rule in most act of state cases would point to application of the law
of the state where the act took place. That rule may be disregarded in certain instances in
which the law thus chosen would violate the strong public policy of the forum, for example, a
policy against expropriation without compensation. Id. § 443 reporter's note 1; see also
Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections In Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175,
178-82 (1967).
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upon courts in the United States the responsibility of self-restraint
when actions of other sovereign states are called into question by liti-
gants. The doctrine, binding upon both federal and state courts,3 has
become a matter of increasing concern because it affects international
commercial litigation. Although compelled by neither international
law nor the United States Constitution, the doctrine has constitu-
tional underpinnings that derive from its impact on the separation of
powers among branches of government.4 The doctrine recognizes
that in certain situations the judiciary might not be the appropriate
forum in which to resolve a dispute. In effect, the doctrine questions
the competency of the judicial branch to make and implement deci-
sions of certain kinds in the area of international relations. It
expresses a strong sense that the courts, were they to pass on the
validity of foreign acts of state, might hinder, rather than further, this
country's pursuit of its foreign policy goals.5
The act of state doctrine has been the basis of several lower court
decisions in cases of alleged conspiracies by foreign governments, act-
ing alone or in combination with private companies, in violation of
United States laws.6 Generally, commentators suggest that the courts
have reached inconsistent results in these cases.7 Nevertheless, the
United States Supreme Court consistently has denied petitions for
writs of certiorari.8
3. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).
4. Id. at 423.
5. Id.
6. See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (In an action by
union members against OPEC member nations alleging price setting in violation of United
States antitrust laws, the act of state doctrine was held to bar adjudication.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982); Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577
F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978) (The act of state doctrine barred adjudication of a conversion action
by one holder of an oil concession against another holder who received a concession for the
same area from a different sovereign.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.) (Adjudication of a United States oil company's suit against other
companies was barred by the act of state doctrine because the court refused to consider
Mu'ammar AI-Qadhafi's motivation for nationalizing the plaintiff company's oil fields.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 461 F.2d
1261 (9th Cir.) (The act of state doctrine barred adjudication of a dispute in which a United
States oil company claimed that the Ruler of Sharjah fraudulently issued a territorial decree
which enabled another United States oil company to exploit oil and gas in the area covered by
the decree.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
7. See Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised
Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 A.J.I.L. 68 (1985); and reply, Henkin &
Lowenfeld, Act of State and the Restatement, 79 A.J.I.L. 717 (1985); see also Bazyler,
Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 344-59 (1986). But see Swan, Act
of State at Bay. A Plea on Behalf ofthe Elusive Doctrine, 5 DUKE L.J. 807 (1976).
8. See cases cited supra note 6.
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This Comment identifies the relevant criteria used to determine
the correct application of the act of state doctrine. What emerges
from the cases is a judicial elaboration of a group of factors, applica-
tion of which is becoming a coherent body of law. Two recent cases
are especially helpful points of departure in order to understand the
doctrine. The recent Third Circuit decision in Environmental Tecton-
ics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.9 appears on first impression to be in irrec-
oncilable conflict with Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp. '0 The factual settings of the two cases are set out in
detail in Section IV of this Comment, but a brief introduction is
appropriate at this point. In Clayco, an oil exploration company,
Clayco, alleged that a competitor, Occidental, had received a conces-
sion to drill for oil in Umm Al Qaywayn because Occidental had
bribed that country's oil minister. 1 Clayco further alleged that
Clayco would have been awarded the concession but for the illegal
payment. ' 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that adjudication was barred by the act of state doctrine.' 3 In
Environmental Tectonics a defense contractor, Environmental, alleged
that as a result of bribes distributed to Nigerian government officials,
its competitor, Kirkpatrick, was awarded a contract that Environ-
mental otherwise would have received.' 4 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that adjudication was not barred
by the act of state doctrine. 15
Although the outcomes of these two facially similar cases appear
to be diametrically opposed, this Comment illustrates that both were
correctly decided. More importantly, Clayco Petroleum and Environ-
mental Tectonics serve as the benchmarks for analyzing the emerging
body of considerations employed to determine whether the doctrine
applies in a given case. Part II of this Comment provides a brief dis-
cussion of the origins of the act of state doctrine. In Part III, several
illustrative cases are analyzed to outline the parameters of the doc-
trine. Part IV identifies relevant considerations that the courts should
weigh in determining the applicability of the doctrine. Finally, Part V
of this Comment discusses the advantages to be derived from careful
analysis of the suggested considerations.
9. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17,
1988) (No. 87-2066).
10. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1984).
11. Id. at 405.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 409.
14. Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1056.
15. Id. at 1062.
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II. ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE
Underhill v. Hernandez 16 was an early act of state doctrine case
in which Underhill, an American citizen, claimed that he had been
assaulted, coerced, and detained unlawfully in Venezuela by Her-
nandez. 7 The United States Supreme Court refused to inquire into
the acts of Hernandez, a Venezuelan revolutionary military com-
mander whose government had been recognized by the United States
by the time of the Court's consideration.' 8 In what has been cited as
the classic American statement of the doctrine,' 9 Chief Justice Fuller
said for a unanimous Court:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.2°
The rule of Underhill has been followed and expanded in subsequent
act of state doctrine cases. 2'
Most early act of state doctrine cases involved the expropriation
of property by a foreign state.22 In 1964, for example, the United
16. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
17. Id. at 251.
18. Id. at 254.
19. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1962).
20. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
21. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (The State of New York does not have
the power to reject the policy underlying recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States.);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of all international
negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear."); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 472 (1936) (If an expropriation decree is lawful
and effective under the Constitution and laws of Mexico, it will be recognized as lawful under
the laws of the United States.); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918)
("[W]hen it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted in a given way on the
subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the result cannot be
questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision."); Oejtan v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918) ("[W]hen a government which originates in
revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the dejure
government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect
and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the
commencement of its existence."); American Banana'Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
353 (1908) ("Redress for injuries caused to a citizen of a foreign nation by another nation
through the exercise of de facto powers, even though maintained by means of force alone,
cannot be had in the ordinary municipal courts of another nation, nor even in the courts of the
offending nation without its consent.").
22. As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not passed on the applicability of the
doctrine to an act of a foreign government with respect to property outside the state's territory,
an act of a government not recognized by the United States, or an act alleged to violate a
provision of a treaty, other unambiguous agreement, or principle of customary law not in
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States Supreme Court decided the leading act of state doctrine case,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino," which involved the Cuban
government's expropriation of American sugar interests in Cuba.24
Banco Nacional de Cuba brought an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York to recover from an
American company proceeds of a sale made by the American com-
pany's Cuban sugar operation shortly before the operation was
nationalized." Citing the act of state doctrine, Banco Nacional
argued that the expropriation, an act of a foreign sovereign, could not
be considered as a defense against the claim that the proceeds had
been withheld unlawfully by the American former owners.26 The for-
mer owners argued, however, that the sweeping interdiction of the
doctrine should not apply in a case such as this, because the expropri-
ation was a clear violation of international law. 27 The district court
denied recovery, holding that the doctrine was inapplicable because
the confiscation violated international law in that it was retaliatory,
confiscatory, and discriminatory.28 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment
on different grounds.29
The United States Supreme Court reversed, however, applying
the act of state doctrine.3 ° Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan
stated:
[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-
encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial
Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates
dispute. The Supreme Court has not applied the doctrine recently to a case not involving the
taking of property, as it did in Underhill. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 444 comment b (1987).
23. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
24. Id. at 401.
25. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
26. Id. at 420.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 375.
29. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision on the basis of the
Bernstein exception, under which courts defer to executive pronouncements concerning the
applicability of the act of state doctrine. For a discussion of the impact of the Bernstein
exception in act of state cases, see infra note 89 and accompanying text.
30. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439.
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customary international law.3'
The Supreme Court recognized that there was authority in inter-
national judicial 32 and arbitral33 decisions, as well as in the expres-
sions of national governments 34 and commentators, 35 for the view that
a taking of the kind in Sabbatino violates international law if it is not
for a public purpose, is discriminatory, or is without provision for
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 36  Nonetheless, the
Court observed that communist countries commonly recognize no
obligation to provide compensation. 37  The Court noted that,
although capital exporting nations universally condemn expropria-
tions, capital importing nations do not. 38 Thus, implicit in the Sabba-
31. Id. at 428.
32. Id. at 398; see Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 63, at 87 ("The form of
discrimination which is forbidden is... discrimination based upon nationality and involving
differential treatment by reason of their nationality as between persons belonging to different
national groups."); Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 17, at 46, 47 (An illegal
seizure requires reparation that "as far as possible, wipes out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablishes the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had
not been committed.")
33. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 422; see, e.g., Marguerite de Joly de Sabla, American and
Panamanian General Claims Arbitration 379, 447, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 358, 366 (1955) ("It
is axiomatic that acts of a government in depriving an alien of his property without
compensation impose international responsibility."); Norwegian Shipowners' Case (Norway v.
United States), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 307, 334, 339 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922) (1948) (A state has
a duty to carry out its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,
and it may not invoke provisions of its own laws as an excuse for failure to adhere to its duty.);
Norwegian Claims Case (Norway v. United States), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 39, 74 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1922) ("No state can exercise toward the citizens of another civilized State the 'power
of eminent domain' without respecting the property of such foreign citizens or without paying
just compensation as determined by an impartial tribunal, if necessary.").
34. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 422; see, e.g., Note to the Cuban Government, July 16, 1960, 43
Dept. State Bull. 171 (1960) ("[T]he Government of the United States considers Cuba's
'Nationalization Law' to be manifestly in violation of international law, because it is
discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory."); Note from Secretary of State Hull to Mexican
Ambassador, July 21, 1938, V Foreign Relations of the United States 674 (1938) ("We cannot
admit that foreign government may take the property of American nationals in disregard of
the rule of compensation under international law."); Dispatch from Lord Palmerston to
British Envoy at Athens, Aug. 7, 1846, 39 British and Foreign State Papers 1849-50, at 431-32
("[I]n all countries it is understood that when land belonging to a private individual is required
for purposes of great public utility or of national defense, private right must so far yield to
public interest, that the individual is compelled by law to give up his land to the public,
provided always that he shall receive for it from the public its full and fair value.").
35. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 422; see, e.g., McNair, The Seizure of Property and Enterprises
in Indonesia, 6 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 218, 243-53 (1959) (Nationalization of foreign-
owned private property must be motivated by a bona fide social purpose, must be free of
discrimination, and must be accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation.); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 444
(1987).
36. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429.
37. Id. at 429.
38. Id. at 430. The Court pointed out that the disagreement between the relevant
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tino decision was the notion that a United States court, as an
instrument of a capital exporting country, might not be viewed as an
impartial forum for purposes of determining whether the expropria-
tion violated international law.39 Therefore, the Court concluded, the
act of state doctrine was indeed applicable. 4°
III. SETTING THE OUTSIDE BOUNDARIES OF THE DOCTRINE
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court identified a number of consid-
erations to be balanced "on a case-by-case basis:"' 4 1 (1) the degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international
law, (2) the importance of the issue to United States foreign relations,
and (3) whether the government that perpetrated the act is still in
existence.4 2 In addition, the federal courts have recognized other rele-
vant considerations: whether the sovereign action in question is
standards reflected the divergence between the national interests of capital exporting nations,
in a free enterprise system, and the social ideologies of countries that favor state control of the
means of production. Id.
39. Id.
40. In response to the Sabbatino decision, Congress enacted the Second Hickenlooper
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 653 (1964) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1982)). The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which
a claim of title or other right to property is* asserted by any party including a
foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced
through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of international law including the principles of
compensation and other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, That this
subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign
state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or
other right to property acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not
more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the
confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the
President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in
that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a
suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
Id. Upon remand, the district court recognized that the Congressional overruling of Sabbatino
applied to the Sabbatino case itself. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relation Law reflects
the statutory overruling of Sabbatino:
In the absence of a Presidential determination to the contrary, the act of
state doctrine will not be applied in a case involving a claim of title or other right
to property, when the claim is based on the assertion that a foreign state confis-
cated the property in violation of international law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 444
(1987).
41. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
42. Id.
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inherently commercial in character,4 3 the purpose of the sovereign's
act, 44 the strength of the United States' regulatory interest, 45 and
whether the legality of the sovereign action is called into question.46
Cumulation of these factors is not important. Instead they are
the particulars the courts examine in reaching for a broader percep-
tion of the political sensitivities of each case. The factors guide reso-
lution of two related issues: first, whether the judiciary is the
appropriate forum in which to settle the dispute, and second, whether
adjudication will interfere with the Executive Branch in the perform-
ance of its duties. In other words, stating the factors is not very help-
ful, but after working through the facts of act of state cases with the
factors in mind, their cohesiveness becomes apparent. Before analyz-
ing the factors in the contexts of Clayco and Environmental Tectonics,
it will be instructive to consider two earlier cases that illustrate
parameters for application of the act of state doctrine.
A. The Williams Case
Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.47 is an example of cases in
which application of the act of state doctrine is not appropriate. Wil-
liams alleged that Curtiss-Wright had employed monopolistic prac-
tices to dominate the world-wide market f6r the sale of surplus J-65
aircraft engines and parts.48 Curtiss-Wright responded that the act of
state doctrine prohibited the court from scrutinizing a foreign govern-
ment's motive for refusing to purchase engines and parts from Wil-
liams.4 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the act of state doctrine did not apply because there was no
43. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)
(Although a plurality of the court embraced a commercial exception to the doctrine, the
majority rejected such a sweeping exception.); infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
44. See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (The act of state
doctrine looks to the underlying purpose of the sovereign's act.), cert. denied., 454 U.S. 1163
(1982); infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
45. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (The
strength of the United States regulatory interest must not be outweighed by the necessity of
judicial abstention.); infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
46. See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1061 (3d Cir.
1988) (Judicial inquiry into the motivations, as opposed to the legal validity, of the public acts
of a foreign state, does not warrant application of the doctrine.), petition for cert. filed, 57
U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 87-2066); infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
But see Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir.) (Examination of the motivation for
a foreign sovereign's act inevitably involves scrutinizing the validity of the act.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 984 (1977); infra notes 144-64 and accompanying text.
47. 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
48. Id. at 303.
49. Id. at 302.
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showing that the adjudication would hinder international relations.
Absent such a showing, the court stated, the act of state doctrine
would not be applied to thwart legitimate American regulatory
goals." The court found that Williams' complaint treated the foreign
governments not as wrongdoers against Williams, but rather as fellow
victims of Curtiss-Wright's unlawful practices."
Several factors indicated that the act of state doctrine was inap-
plicable to the facts of Williams. First, there was no reason to believe
that international relations would be affected because the foreign gov-
ernments were neither parties to the action nor implicated in any
wrongdoing. Second, the principal issue in the case was unimportant
to United States foreign relations, and the only law called into ques-
tion was United States antitrust law. Third, the United States had a
strong interest in enforcing its regulatory interests. The factors relied
on in Williams illustrate some of the outer boundaries for determining
when the doctrine should not be applied.
B. The OPEC Case
Conversely, International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers (JAM) v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) 52 was a typical case in which the act of state doctrine
was applicable. In OPEC, the IAM sued OPEC and its member
nations, alleging price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act 53 and
demanding treble damages and injunctive relief 4 The IAM claimed
that OPEC had targeted and victimized United States markets delib-
erately and that such actions directly resulted in higher prices to
American consumers. 5 The United States District Court for the
Central District of California dismissed the complaint and held not
only that member nations of OPEC were entitled to sovereign immu-
nity but also that member nations were not persons who could be
sued under American antitrust laws.5 6
50. Id. at 304. The court noted that in reality Curtiss-Wright was more concerned with
the difficulties of producing evidence than with any disruption of foreign relations. Id. at 304.
Additionally, the court recognized that if Williams could not obtain direct evidence from the
foreign governments, other sources of proof might still be available, and that in any event it
was too early in the litigation for the court to foreclose the possibility that the foreign
governments involved might cooperate. Id.
51. Id. at 303.
52. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
54. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1355. These remedies are provided in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 15-16 (1982).
55. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1356.
56. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court on the alternative ground that, under
the act of state doctrine, the exercise of federal court jurisdiction
would be improper." The appellate court emphasized that develop-
ment and exploitation of a country's natural resources are important
governmental functions. 58 In addition, although United States law
prohibits cartels, no consensus exists in the international community
that cartels are illegal. 59 Furthermore, the impact of the OPEC cartel
upon United States foreign relations was another significant reason to
invoke the doctrine. As the appellate court noted, a judicial pro-
nouncement against OPEC might have hindered the Executive
Branch in negotiations with the cartel.' Thus in this case, the
strength of the United States' regulatory interest was outweighed by
political necessities.
The entire setting of the OPEC case showed that it was a prob-
lem for politicians and diplomats, not for judges. Had the Ninth Cir-
cuit granted relief to the IAM, that relief would have amounted to an
order from a United States court, "instructing a group of foreign sov-
ereigns to alter their chosen means of allocating and profiting from
their own valuable natural resources."'" The judiciary was not the
proper forum in which to resolve the dispute.
The facts of OPEC provided a compelling justification for appli-
cation of the act of state doctrine, but in other cases, the justification
has not been so clear. This difficulty was highlighted in the recent
decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and
Ninth Circuits in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.62 and Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.63
These two cases "provide more difficult fact patterns within which to
determine the applicability of the act of state doctrine.
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 477 F. Supp. 553, 569 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
57. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1361-62.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1361. Consider Sabbatino's mandate that if there is no consensus in
international law, United States courts should not apply United States law, absent compelling
circumstances. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
60. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1361.
61. Id.
62. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
63. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17,
1988) (No. 87-2066).
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IV. THE FACTUAL SETTINGS OF THE CLA YCO AND
ENVIRONMENTAL TECTONICS CASES
A. The Clayco Case
In Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., Clayco
sued Occidental, which had been its competitor for an oil drilling con-
cession in Umm Al Qaywayn. 6 Clayco's suit apparently resulted
indirectly from a 1977 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
action alleging that Occidental had made illegal or questionable pay-
ments in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.65 In that
action, Occidental consented to the entry of a permanent injunction
prohibiting any additional payments and further agreed to conduct an
internal investigation.66 Occidental also agreed to prepare a special
report on the alleged illegal payments for its stockholders and the
SEC.6 7 The resulting payments report revealed that several illegal
payments had been made and inaccurately reported on Occidental's
books.6" In 1978, the Oakland Tribune reported that Occidental had
paid approximately thirty million dollars to Sheikh Sultan bin Ahmed
Muallah (Sultan), Umm Al Qaywayn's Petroleum Minister and son of
its ruler, Sheikh Ahmed Al Mualla (Ahmed), to obtain an oil and gas
concession." After publication of the newspaper account, Clayco
officials, believing that they had failed in their effort to win the con-
cession because of the Occidental payments, filed suit.70 The com-
plaint alleged violations of the Sherman71 and Robinson-Patman
Acts,72 as well as violations of the California Business and Professions
Code73 and common law.74
Clayco claimed that the payments in question were bribes to
induce Sultan to award the oil drilling concession to Occidental. 7 It
further contended that Ahmed, the Petroleum Minister's father, had
agreed that Clayco would receive the concession, but that instead the
concession had been awarded to Occidental as a direct result of Occi-
dental's illegal payment.76 Relying on the act of state doctrine, the
64. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 404.
65. 15 U.S.C. 77(b)-78KK (1982 & Supp. 1989).





71. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
73. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720, 17045 (West 1941).
74. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 405.
75. Id. at 406.
76. Id. at 405.
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United States District Court for the Central District of California dis-
missed Clayco's claim, noting that exercises of sovereignty were
implicated and that adjudication would interfere with United States
foreign policy.1
7
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal, also relying on the act of state doctrine.78
The appellate court concluded that a sovereign decision authorizing
the exploitation of important natural resources effectuated public
rather than private interests.79 Without sovereign activity effectuating
public interests, the court noted, the act of state doctrine would not
apply.8" The court also addressed Clayco's argument that the act of
state doctrine was inapplicable because judicial examination of the
sovereign's action would not be so intrusive as to require application
of the doctrine.8' The court rejected this contention, stating that vali-
dation of Clayco's claims depended on proof that the award of the
concession had been motivated by the illegal payments and that
embarrassment necessarily would result from adjudication.82 There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit held, the act of state doctrine barred adjudica-
tion of the dispute.83
B. The Environmental Tectonics Case
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reached an apparently opposite result from the Ninth Circuit's result
in Clayco. The factual situation of Environmental Tectonics v. W.S.
Kirkpatrick, Inc.84 was similar to that in Clayco. In both cases, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, American corporations, had
made illegal payments to foreign officials. Nevertheless, the facts of
Environmental Tectonics provided inadequate justification for applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine.
In Environmental Tectonics, Environmental Tectonics Corpora-
tion International ("Environmental") alleged that Kirkpatrick had
bribed Nigerian officials in order to obtain a defense contract.8 " Envi-
77. Id. at 406.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 407.
81. Id.
82. Id. Additionally, the court rejected Clayco's contention that a commercial exception
to the act of state doctrine should have been recognized. Id. at 408; see infra Section IV(C).
83. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 409.
84. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17,
1988) (No. 87-2066).
85. Id. at 1054.
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ronmental sought to recover damages8 6 after learning that its unsuc-
cessful bid on the disputed contract was lower than Kirkpatrick's
winning bid.8 7 The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey dismissed the action, citing the act of state doctrine.
8
Before making its determination, the district court requested a
Bernstein Letter,89 an opinion from the State Department as to
whether the act of state doctrine should be applied in the circum-
stances presented.9" The letter, drafted by Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal
Advisor of the State Department, expressed the view that the act of
state doctrine is applicable only when the validity or legality of the
foreign government's action is called into question.9' After consider-
ing the allegations in the complaint, the State Department opined that
the litigation involved judicial inquiry into the motivation for the
Nigerian government's award of the contract, as opposed to the legal
validity of the award, and thus concluded that the doctrine was inap-
86. Environmental Tectonics brought this action alleging violations of the Federal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968 (1982
& Supp. 1989), the New-Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act, 2 C N.J.C.S. § 41-1 et seq., and the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). Id.
87. The action was commenced shortly after Kirkpatrick pleaded guilty to a charge of
violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1982).
88. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1391-98
(D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001
(U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 87-2066). As an alternative ground for dismissal, the court found
that Environmental had failed to allege a pattern of racketeering under either RICO or the
New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act. Id. at 1389-91.
89. Id. app. A at 1402. The term "Bernstein Letter" is derived from the Second Circuit's
opinion in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). Bernstein was a German national who owned a corporation that was
confiscated by the Nazi government during World War ii. Id. at 375. He brought an action in
United States courts seeking recovery of damages. Id. The Second Circuit initially dismissed
Bernstein's suit on act of state grounds. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme.
163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947). The court reversed itself after receiving a letter from the State
Department that stated that it was United States policy to permit courts to exercise
jurisdiction over claims to recover property expropriated by Nazi officials. Bernstein. 2 10 F.2d
at 376.
90. Environmental Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. 1381 app. A at 1402.
91. Mr. Sofaer relied principally on a United States amicus curiae brief before the United
States Supreme Court which stated in part:
While judicial examination of purpose may on occasion implicate some of the
concerns underlying the act of state doctrine, the doctrine only precludes judicial
questioning of the validity or legality of foreign government action .... Judicial
inquiry into the purpose of a foreign sovereign's act would not entail the
particular kind of harm that the act of state doctrine is designed to avoid.
Id. (quoting United States Government briefs amnicus curiae in support of petitions for a writ
of certiorari in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); and in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977)).
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1169
plicable. 92 However, Mr. Sofaer went on to warn that apart from the
act of state question, inquiries into the motivation and validity of for-
eign states' actions and discovery against foreign officials might seri-
ously affect United States foreign relations. 93 Mr. Sofaer cautioned
that due regard for foreign sovereign sensibilities should be exercised
at every stage of the litigation and emphasized the importance of
sharply limited discovery.
94
The district court interpreted the State Department's letter as a
sign of ambivalence about whether the doctrine applied and dismissed
the State Department's caveat regarding discovery as impractical and
unconstitutional. 9 The court found that because a subpoena would
have to be issued for records in Nigeria, foreign relations of this coun-
try might be adversely affected. 96 Therefore, it held, the doctrine pro-
hibited adjudication of the dispute.97
The Third Circuit reversed and held that the act of state doctrine
was inapplicable. 9 Although the appellate court found that an award
of a defense contract could be a government action of sufficient public
importance to suggest application of the doctrine,99 it held neverthe-
less that the doctrine was inapplicable on the facts before it. 1°° It did
so, the court stated, because adjudication of the dispute would not
necessarily involve a threat to United States foreign policy' 0 1 and
Kirkpatrick had failed to prove that such a threat existed. 10 2 In addi-
tion, the Third Circuit found that the district court had erred in inter-
preting the State Department's letter as expressing ambivalence about
whether the doctrine applied. 03 Rather, the appellate court said, the
State Department had indicated clearly that the doctrine did not
apply. 104
V. RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Characterization of the Sovereign's Action
Courts generally will look to the character of the foreign sover-
92. Id. app. A at 1403.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1398.
96. Id. at 1397.
97. Id. at 1398.
98. Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1062.
99. Id. at 1061-62.
100. Id. at 1062.
101. Id. at 1061-62.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1062.
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eign's action as a first step in determining whether the act of state
doctrine is implicated in a case. Initially it is important to note that
the doctrine is inapplicable when the sovereign activity is effectuating
a private rather than a public purpose. 0 5 In addition, the doctrine's
applicability may be determined by the characterization of the sover-
eign action involved as either ministerial or executive. The Third Cir-
cuit's decision in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.'°6
illustrates this point.
Mannington Mills, an American manufacturer of floor coverings,
brought an antitrust action against Congoleum, another American
floor covering manufacturer, alleging that Congoleum obtained for-
eign patents from various countries by fraudulent acts, which, had
they been perpetrated in the United States, would have subjected
Congoleum to antitrust liability.0 I Congoleum held American pat-
ents for the manufacture of chemically embossed vinyl floor coverings
and had obtained twenty-six corresponding patents in foreign coun-
tries.'0 8 Mannington Mills alleged that Congoleum, in applying to
foreign patent offices, made fraudulent representations as to the per-
formance of the flooring, test data, information regarding the inven-
tion, and misleading statements about the status and content of
United States patents.0 9 Congoleum responded that adjudication of
the dispute should be barred by the act of state doctrine because it
would require an inquiry into the policies governing foreign govern-
ments' grants of patents. 10 As such, the decisions by the foreign gov-
ernments arguably were giving effect to their political and public
interests. "I' The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the granting of a patent was a "ministerial activity" of a
commercial branch of government and did not constitute the kind of
sovereign action that required application of the act of state doc-
trine. "2 Thus, in Mannington Mills, the sovereign activity merely
formed the background to the dispute; the only sovereign governmen-
tal action was the neutral application of the sovereigns' laws.
In Clayco, the Ninth Circuit found that a sovereign decision
authorizing the exploitation of important natural resources, oil
105. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
106. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
107. Id. at 1290.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1292.
111. Id. at 1294.
112. Id.
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reserves, effectuated a public purpose." 3 By engaging in judicial scru-
tiny of sovereign decisions allocating the benefits of oil develop-
ment,' 14 the Ninth Circuit in effect would have been sitting in
judgment of the foreign sovereign, an intrusion not present in Man-
nington Mills. In these circumstances a judicial pronouncement could
and most probably would increase foreign relation tensions and
embarrass the political branches of the United States government in
the conduct of foreign policy."I5 Because Umm Al Qaywayn's most
precious resource was its oil reserves, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling
to say that the sheikdom's grant of drilling rights was the result of an
illegal payment by Occidental, rather than an important policy deci-
sion by the sovereign.
In Environmental Tectonics, 116 the Third Circuit also considered
the purpose of the sovereign action. Environmental argued that the
district court erred in applying the act of state doctrine because the
award of a military procurement contract was not a sufficient expres-
sion of a government's public interest to trigger the doctrine." 7 The
Third Circuit found that although the award of a defense contract
could be a sufficient expression of the government's public interest to
be considered an act of state, II the doctrine was inapplicable in this
case because no proof was offered that adjudication would interfere
with United States foreign policy,' ' nor was the legality of Nigeria's
actions called into question.
20
The cases appear to say that a government defense contract, at
issue in Environmental Tectonics, is a more compelling government
interest than the granting of a patent, at issue in Mannington Mills,
but less compelling than the granting of an oil concession, at issue in
Clayco. If Environmental Tectonics had involved the Nigerian Gov-
113. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1984).
114. Id. at 407 (citing Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92
(D.C. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972)).
115. See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[C]ourts
should not enter at the will of the litigants into a delicate area of foreign policy which the
executive and legislative branches have chosen to approach with restraint."), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The act of state
rubric . . . is perceived by the Supreme Court as a judicial articulation of the separation of
powers doctrine."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1978).
116. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick. Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988),
petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17. 1988) (No. 87-2066).
117. Id. at 1058.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1061.
120. Id. at 1062.
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ernment's choice between purchasing military aircraft'and purchasing
tanks, it seems likely that the Third Circuit would have invoked the
doctrine in order to avoid intruding on a foreign sovereign's policy
decision. In the actual case, however, the Nigerian defense depart-
ment, an important policy making department of the government,
issued the contract, but the litigation involved a commercial selection
between equivalent products from competing vendors. Such decisions
normally are based on standards with which courts are familiar, ques-
tions as to which company offered the lowest bid, which company
provided the best service, which system was more reliable, and which
delivery schedule met the country's needs.
The underlying sense of the Clayco and Environmental Tectonics
decisions is plain. Measured by any gauge of political sensitivity,
there is a vast difference between a foreign sovereign's decision as to
how best to exploit a nation's most valued resource and the award of a
routine defense contract. Clayco is closer to OPECI2 than to Wil-
liams.2 2 and Mannington Mills;23 Environmental Tectonics edges
toward Williams and Mannington Mills, and away from OPEC.
Moreover, although Clayco and Environmental Tectonics both
engaged the courts in judging the actions of foreign officials in terms
that could have political ramifications, the certitude with which the
courts could evaluate those actions-the availability of surer stan-
dards-further distinguishes the two cases. Clayco required judging
the acts of the top policy making levels of government applying the
indeterminable standards of executive decision making; Environmen-
tal Tectonics involved lower level officials performing a more adminis-
trative task and applying the ordinary standards of commercial
decision making. These sensitivities, worked out over time, "case by
case''124 in the common law tradition, supply an emerging coherence
to the act of state decisions.
121. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied., 454 U.S.
1163 (1982); see supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
122. Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982); see supra notes 47-51
and accompanying text.
123. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); see supra
notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
124. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (An act of state
determination involves "cases by case analysis" in order to resolve the issue of whether or not
the doctrine should be applied.).
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B. Determination of the Sovereign's Motive
1. GAUGING THE INTRUSIVENESS OF REVIEWING
SOVEREIGN MOTIVATION
Section 469 of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations
Law states that United States courts will refrain from judging the
validity of a foreign state's governmental acts done within its bor-
ders.' 25 In Sabbatino, for example, the United States Supreme Court
refused to decide whether Cuba's expropriation of American sugar
interests located in Cuba was legally valid or a violation of interna-
tional law. 126 In other kinds of cases, the validity or legality of a for-
eign sovereign's act may not be challenged specifically, but
nonetheless may be implicated in some way. Antitrust and corruption
litigation in the international arena frequently involves questions as to
whether a foreign sovereign was motivated to perform a certain act by
a defendant corporation.' 27
Lower courts'28 and commentators 129 disagree as to whether the
doctrine should be invoked when a foreign sovereign's motivation for
its action is called into question. This Comment contends that courts
should be guided by the degree of intrusion into a foreign sovereign's
authority that would result were the court to adjudicate the dispute.
In other words, if adjudication would "impugn or question the nobil-
ity of a foreign sovereign's motivation"' 30 the act of state doctrine
should be invoked.
In Clayco, the plaintiff argued that judicial examination of the
sovereign's action would not be sufficiently intrusive to warrant appli-
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 469 (1987).
126. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439.
127. See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988),
petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 87-2066); Clayco Petroleum
Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040
(1984); Williams v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982); Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
128. Compare Clayco, 712 F.2d at 408 (act of state doctrine applied where plaintiff's claim
depended upon proof that the motivation for the sovereign act was bribery) and Hunt, 550
F.2d at 78 (doctrine applicable where the judiciary was asked to decide Qadahfi's motivation
for nationalizing his oil fields) with Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1060 (rejecting
Clayco's application of the doctrine to ban consideration of the foreign sovereign's motive) and
Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979) (Motivation and
validity are not equally protected by the act of state rubric.).
129. See Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 357 n.190
(1986).
130. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407.
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cation of the act of state doctrine. 3 ' The Ninth Circuit found that
the very existence of Clayco's claim depended upon proving that the
motivation for the Petroleum Minister's act was bribery, and thus,
embarrassment would result.'32 The court noted that two earlier
cases similarly had limited an inquiry that would have impugned or
questioned the nobility of a foreign nation's motivation. I"
The Clayco court also made note of a related case, Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,'34 in which the sovereign
activity involved was the granting of the identical oil concession at
issue in the Clayco case. 135 In Buttes, Occidental brought a private
antitrust action for treble damages and injunctive relief against Clayco
Petroleum and Buttes Gas and Oil Company. 36 The complaint
alleged that the defendants, Clayco and Buttes, had conspired in
restraint of trade to monopolize the exploration and development of
petroleum reserves in the Persian Gulf.'37 Occidental and the defend-
ants had held offshore oil concessions that were adjacent to each other
in the Persian Gulf, granted by two different sheikdoms, Umm Al
Qaywayn and Sharjah respectively. 38 Occidental alleged that the
defendants had instigated a dispute between the two shiekdoms over
sovereign rights to a portion of the Gulf containing rich oil reserves in
order to obtain rights to exploit territory for which Occidental held
the concession. 39 The trial court granted Clayco's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient ser-
vice of process, 140 and then dismissed the claim against Buttes, citing
the act of state doctrine.' 4 ' The court determined that in order for
Occidental to prevail in its claim for damages, it would have to prove
that the Ruler of Sharjah had issued a fraudulent territorial waters
decree because of Buttes' action.'42 The court found that Occidental
was asking the court to sit in judgment of the foreign sovereign and
that such an inquiry into the sovereign's motivation was the very kind
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui, 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979).
134. 331 F. Supp. 92 (D.C. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972). In Buttes, Occidental was the plaintiff and Clayco was one of the defendants.
The case against Clayco was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Id.
135. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1984).




140. Id. at 98.
141. Id. at 113.
142. Id. at 110.
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of intrusion the doctrine was meant to avoid.' 43
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit also refused to examine a foreign sovereign's
motivation. Hunt alleged that Mobil and six other oil companies vio-
lated antitrust laws when they conspired with the government of
Libya to eliminate Hunt as their competitor in Libya. 4 The case
arose after Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi assumed power in Libya
atop a Revolutionary Command Council.'46 The new government
announced a policy of increasing the price of Libyan crude oil, as well
as the government's share or "take" in the price, by increasing gov-
ernment control over production and production facilities.'47
Fearful that the Libyan policy would result in escalated demands
by oil producing nations in the Persian Gulf region, seven major oil
companies operating in Libya covertly structured their resistance to
such demands.'48 In an effort to present a united front, the companies
met secretly, after they first obtained a clearance letter from the
Department of Justice absolving them of liability for any antitrust vio-
lations that might result from their concerted action. "' As a condi-
tion for issuing the letter, the Justice Department insisted that all
independent Libyan oil producers be included in any joint action pro-
posed, "0 so the independent producers, including Hunt, were invited
to participate in the meetings.' 5 ' The meetings culminated in a shar-
ing agreement that required, in essence, that if Libyan oil production
were to be cut back as a result of government action, the oil compa-
nies would share proportionately in the cutback. 52 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Hunt's fields were nationalized." 3
In his action for antitrust damages against the oil companies,
Hunt alleged that the seven major oil companies had conspired with
Libya to eliminate him as their competitor and that the agreement
thus had prevented him from independently negotiating with
Qadhafi. ' Hunt claimed that the other oil companies had
encouraged him not to negotiate directly with Qadhafi because they
143. Id.
144. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
145. Id. at 72.
146. Id.







154. Id. at 72.
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had known that if he did not negotiate, his fields would be national-
ized."' 5 Hunt neither challenged the validity of the Libyan govern-
ment's act nor joined Libya as a party.'56 Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit held that adjudication was barred by the act of state doc-
trine. 57 Specifically, the appellate court found that in order for Hunt
to be successful in his claim, he would have to prove that but for the
oil companies' combination or conspiracy with the government of
Libya, Libya would not have confiscated his property.I" The Second
Circuit noted that adjudication of the dispute would entail a whole-
sale examination of Libyan policy: how Libya treated other compa-
nies, what provoked its displeasure, and whether or not concessions
by Hunt would have appeased Qadhafi. 159 Hunt argued that the act
of state doctrine is applicable only when a determination of the valid-
ity or legality of the foreign sovereign's action is at issue.' 60 The court
rejected this argument, finding that legality could not be isolated from
the issue of motivation of the foreign sovereign.' 6 ' The court held
that such an inquiry was not within the factfinding competence of the
judicial branch. 1
62
A dissenting opinion argued that the majority was incorrect in
assuming that simply because Hunt would have had to prove
Qadhafi's motivations in order to prove damages, adjudication inevi-
tably would have involved ruling on the validity of Qadhafi's acts.
163
As the majority pointed out, however, the State Department already
had characterized Qadhafi's act as a political reprisal against the
United States, making the validity of his action a matter on which the
political branch of the United States Government already had taken a
position. 164 Hunt was asking the court to hold that Libya would not
have acted in the same manner were it not for the conspiracy of the
defendant oil companies, calling upon the court to judge the same
issue that the State Department already had addressed.
The issue of whether courts should consider the motivation of a
foreign sovereign's acts is intrinsically tied to whether the validity of a
government's act is being called into question. Hunt illustrates cir-
cumstances that militate against considering sovereign motivation.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 76.
157. Id. at 79.
158. Id. at 76.
159. Id. at 81.
160. Id. at 78.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 80, (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 78.
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Because the highest levels of the Libyan government were involved
and because there were no judicially manageable standards against
which to judge Qadhafi's motivation for nationalizing the oil fields,
the court had no basis to form a decision. The essence of Hunt's
claim was that the oil companies' agreement with him affected
Qadhafi's decision to nationalize his fields. The Second Circuit recog-
nized that this contention would have been difficult, if not impossible,
to prove in trial. In addition, the court was being asked to question
the State Department's analysis that Qadhafi nationalized Libyan oil
fields in retaliation against the United States Government.' 65 In order
for Hunt to prevail in the litigation, the court would have to find that
Qadahfi nationalized Hunt's fields because Hunt would not negotiate
with him.
2. CONTRASTING THE INTRUSIVENESS IN THE CLA YCO AND
ENVIRONMENTAL TECTONICS CASES
As in Hunt, the facts in Clayco 16 6 provide justification for not
considering the sovereign's motivation. If the Ninth Circuit had
employed the same motivation analysis in Clayco that the Second Cir-
cuit used in Hunt,'6 7 then most likely it would have found that in
order to prevail in its litigation, Clayco would have had to prove that
but for the bribe, Occidental would not have received the oil conces-
sion. As in Hunt, the trial court would have been expected to make a
decision without the benefit of judicially manageable standards. The
sovereign act of deciding how best to develop and exploit a country's
natural resources involves political as well as economic factors. For
instance, Clayco also had been accused of bribing a neighboring ruler
to induce him to assert a fraudulent territorial claim to the same oil
rich sea beds for which a drilling concession was later granted to
Occidental by the Petroleum Minister of Umm Al Qaywayn. t6 8 It is
realistic to assume that an Arab shiekdom would not grant a conces-
sion to a company that had attempted to induce a neighboring
sheikdom to assert a fraudulent claim to property that the ruler of
Umm Al Qaywayn considered to be part of his territory.
In contrast, the Environmental Tectonics'69 case provides a less
165. Id. at 77.
166. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1984); see supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
168. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (D.C. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 461 F. 2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); see supra notes 134-
43 and accompanying text.
169. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988),
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compelling fact pattern for refusing to examine judicially the motive
of the foreign sovereign. Environmental alleged that but for the fact
that Kirkpatrick had bribed Nigerian officials, Environmental would
have been awarded the defense contract.7 0 Environmental offered as
proof the fact that its bid was significantly lower than Kirkpatrick's
bid.17' Although the case involved a Nigerian defense contract, it
would seem that the effect of the bribe could be assessed by reviewing
the proposals both companies submitted to the Nigerian government.
A judicially manageable standard would appear to exist in this
instance because United States courts frequently deal with contract
issues in commercial litigation.
C: The Commercial Nature of the Activity
1. SETTING THE STAGE - THE DUNHILL CASE
In Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,172
Clayco argued 73 that the court should recognize the commercial
exception that was adopted by a four justice plurality of the United
States Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba.'74 The Dunhill case arose after the Cuban government confis-
cated the businesses and assets of five leading manufacturers of Cuban
cigars.17 All of the companies were organized under Cuban law and
previously had sold large quantities of cigars to three American com-
panies: Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., (Dunhill), Saks & Co. (Saks),
and Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. (Faber).176 After the confiscation, the
Cuban government named interventors to take possession and operate
the businesses.1 77 The interventors continued to ship cigars to the
United States. The former owners of the Cuban companies, most of
whom had fled to the United States, brought actions against the three
American importers for trademark infringement and for the purchase
price of the cigars that had been shipped from the seized plants.
178
Subsequent to a final decision in related litigation,' 79 the Cuban
petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 87-2066); see supra notes
84-104 and accompanying text.
170. Id. at 1056.
171. Id.
172. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040.
173. Id. at 408.
174. 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (plurality opinion).




179. The interventors and the Cuban Government had brought a separate action against the
former owners' attorneys seeking to restrain further prosecution of the actions brought by the
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interventors and the Republic of Cuba were allowed to participate as
parties to the action. 8 0
Both the former owners and the interventors asserted claims to
the proceeds of $700,000 worth of tobacco shipped to the three
importers after the confiscation.' 8 In addition, at the time of the con-
fiscation, the three importers had owed $477,200 for cigars shipped
before the confiscation. 8 2 The importers had paid this balance to the
interventors after the confiscation because the importers believed that
the interventors were entitled to collect the accounts receivable of the
confiscated businesses.8 3 The former owners demanded payment of
these accounts as well.'
8 4
The District Court held that, under the act of state doctrine, it
was required to give full legal effect to Cuba's confiscation insofar as it
involved a taking of property owned by Cuban nationals and located
in Cuba. 5 Therefore, the court found, the interventors were entitled
to collect all sums due and unpaid for shipments made after the con-
fiscation.' 86 With regard to the pre-confiscation accounts, however,
the court found that because the situs of the accounts receivable was
in the United States and not in Cuba, the former owners, rather than
the interventors, were entitled to collect the money from the import-
ers.' 8 7 This result was reached even though the American importers
already had paid the pre-confiscation accounts receivable to the
interventors. 8
The American importers then claimed that their payment of the
pre-confiscation accounts had been made in error and that they were
entitled to collect those sums from the interventors by way of set-off
and counterclaim.' 89 The Cuban government argued that the
interventors' obligation to repay was a quasi-contractual debt having
a situs in Cuba and that their refusal to pay the debt was an act of
state. '9 The district court rejected the Cuban Government's conten-
former owners. The court determined that the interventors were entitled to the proceeds of
sales consummated post-intervention, but the prior owners trademark litigation was permitted
to continue. F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd,
375 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).









189. Id. at 688.
190. Id. at 689.
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tion, finding that the situs of the debt was in the United States and
that none of the interventors' acts qualified as an act of state.' 91 As a
result of the District Court's holding, two of the importers, Faber and
Saks, both of whom owed more to the interventors for post-confisca-
tion purchases than the set-off amount for payment of pre-confisca-
tion obligations, were completely satisfied by the judgment.' 92
However the third importer, Dunhill, was entitled to more money for
the mistaken pre-confiscation payment than it owed for the post-con-
fiscation shipment.' 93 Dunhill was granted judgment for the amount
due, and the Cuban Government appealed.'94 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit found that the situs of the debt was in Cuba
and that the obligation to repay had been repudiated during the
course of the litigation in a manner that constituted an act of state. '95
The United States Supreme Court held that adjudication of the
Dunhill case was not barred by the act of state doctrine.' 96 The plu-
rality opinion 97 noted that allowing foreign governments to hide
behind their sovereignty when dealing in purely commercial activity
would threaten the stability of international trade. 9 The Justices
pointed out that subjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in
their commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting
their sovereignty than would attempts to review their governmental
acts. 99 The plurality, citing Sabbatino, noted that "some aspects of
international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than
do others. ' ' 200 When foreign governments act in a commercial capac-
ity, the powers they exercise are not peculiar to a sovereign. 2 1
Instead their power is the same as the power exercised by a private





195. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 458 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973); rev'd sub nom. Alfred D,1nhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (plurality opinion).
196. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 690.
197. No majority view prevailed in determining why the act of state doctrine was
inapplicable. Four Justices-White, Burger, Powell and Rehnquist-believed that the act of
state doctrine should not be applied to foreign sovereigns in the course of "purely commercial
operations." Id. at 706 (plurality opinion). Five Justices, however, rejected the application of
a "commercial exception" to the act of state doctrine. Id. at 715 (Stevens. J., concurring); id.
at 728 (Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 703 (plurality opinion).
199. Id. at 703-04.
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2. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON A COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION
The Clayco court attempted to distinguish the sovereign action at
issue in Dunhill by saying that the government action involved in
Clayco could not have been taken by a private citizen.2 °3 However, it
is also doubtful that the Cuban interventors' refusal to honor debts
following the government's expropriation could have been accom-
plished by a private citizen without government sanction. Instead of
carving out a broad commercial exception to the act of state doctrine,
courts should take cognizance of Sabbatino's mandate to adjudicate
on a "case by case basis."2" In other words, as a bright line rule for
determining the application of the doctrine, reliance on the commer-
cial exception is misplaced. Rather, the commercial nature of the
action is only one factor. As the Supreme Court has made clear:
The greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for
the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can
then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circum-
stances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with inter-
national justice.2" 5
The Dunhill plurality noted that there is little if any codification or
consensus in international law as to the exercise of governmental pow-
ers,20 6 however, rules governing commercial transactions involving
private parties exist under international law.20 7
Act of state cases seem to suggest that whether a foreign sover-
eign's act is basically commercial in nature is relevant but rarely
determinative. 20 8 Generally, characterizing an act as commercial will
mean that the action is in the control of politically less visible officials,
that the legal issues are more suitable for judicial determination than
otherwise would be the case, and that the action does not engage the
larger political or welfare interests of a foreign nation. But it is not
203. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1984); see supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying note 41.
205. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
206. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704.
207. Schmitthoff, The Unification or Harmonization of Law By Means of Standard
Contracts and General Conditions, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 551, 563-64 (1968); see also A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE 1-2 (1975); Gal, The Commercial Law of
Nations and the Law of International Trade, 6 CORNELL INT'L J. 55, 64 (1972).
208. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 715 (Powell, J. concurring) ("[T]he line between commercial and
political acts of a foreign state often will be difficult to delineate."); International Ass'n of
Machinists (IAM) v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354,
1360 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[C]ertain seemingly commercial activity will trigger act of state
considerations."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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difficult to imagine cases of commercial activity in which such reason-
ing would be inapplicable. Clayco, for example, could easily be
described as a commercial case. In other words, the appropriate anal-
ysis distinguishes between the public and governmental acts of sover-
eign states on one hand and their private and ministerial acts on the
other.2 °9 In either situation, the acts may or may not be commercial.
3. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT'S DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY
Some critics of the act of state doctrine have urged that the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act 21 (FSIA) definition of a "commercial
activity" exception 21' should determine application of the doctrine in
appropriate cases.2 12 The FSIA provides foreign sovereigns a general
grant of immunity from judicial proceedings in the United States,
2 3
but it does not extend that immunity to activity of foreign sovereigns
that is commercial in nature.21 4 Congress specifically recognized the
distinction between sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine
when it enacted the FSIA.21  Although the doctrine of sovereign
209. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704.
210. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
211. Under Section 1603(d) of the FSIA a commercial activity is defined as "Either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." The
character of an activity is determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
212. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 7, at 352; Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial"
Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311,
329 (1982); Comment, Act of State Doctrine. Applicability of United States Antitrust Law-
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 117, 122-23 (1982); Comment, Antitrust Law-
International Law-Act of State Doctrine-Foreign Antitrust Violations-International Ass'n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1013, 1940 (1982); Comment, Act of State and Sovereign
Immunities Doctrines. The Need to Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 91, 105-07 (1982).
213. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982).
215. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), 649 F.2d at 1354, 1359 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); see, e.g., H.R. Ri'i .
No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 n.1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODr CONG. & ADrIIN.
NEWS 6619 n.1 ("The Committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine
in this legislation."); Jurisdiction of US. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on
H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-57 (1976); Immunities of Foreign States:
Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims & Governmental Relations of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973) (The FSIA "in no way affects existing
law concerning the extent to which the act of state doctrine may be applicable in similar
circumstances."). But see Bazyler, supra note 7, at 352 nn. 160-61 (Criticizing the OPFC Court
for taking the above quotations out of context.).
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immunity is like the act of state doctrine in that it recognizes the need
to respect the sovereignty of foreign states, it is unlike the act of state
doctrine in that it deals mainly with the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal and state courts.216 Even if subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred by the FSIA in a particular case, the court still must deter-
mine whether abstention based on the act of state doctrine is
required 217 because sovereign immunity is based on comity between
nations, 218 while the act of state doctrine is based on the United States
Constitution's plan of separation of powers. 2 9  Although Congress
has expressly denied jurisdictional immunity to foreign sovereigns if
the nature of the sovereign activity is commercial,22° the act of state
doctrine looks to the underlying purpose of the sovereign activity.22'
If the purpose of the foreign sovereign's act is public or governmental,
the act of state doctrine still may be invoked appropriately.222 How-
ever, if the purpose of the foreign sovereign's act is only commercial,
not unlike the power of its private citizens to carry on commerce, then
the doctrine should not be applied.223
In OPEC,224 the union argued that the FSIA superseded the act
of state doctrine. 225  The court held 226 that the act of state doctrine
was not replaced by the definition of "commercial" in the FSIA.227 In
addition, the court rejected the union's assertion that the act of state
doctrine ignores the purpose of the sovereign's act.228 This is impor-
216. See OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1359. See generally Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A
Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982).
217. See OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1359.
218. See Kane, supra note 216, at 390.
219. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 comment (c) (1987)
(Under the act of state doctrine, courts should look to the purpose of the sovereign act); see
also OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360 ("While the FSIA ignores the underlying purpose of a state's
action, the act of state doctrine does not.").
222. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.
1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 87-2066); Clayco
Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1040 (1984); OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
223. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1975)
(Purely commercial activity does not require judicial deference under the act of state
doctrine.).
224. International Assoc. of Machinists (IAM) v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); see supra
notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
225. Id. at 1359.
226. Id.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d); see supra note 211.
228. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360.
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tant because the result of an act of state determination may differ
depending upon whether it is the commercial nature or the purpose of
the sovereign act that is considered by the court.229 The nature test
focuses on the act itself and is objective.230 It provides a narrow
focus, resulting in a restrictive approach to judicial abstention.23" '
This approach is consistent with congressional intent under the
FSIA.2 32 The purpose test, however, looks to whether the foreign
sovereign's act was a policy decision in furtherance of sovereign ends
and is subjective. 233 This test grants broader immunity because even a
commercial activity might have an important governmental pur-
21pose. 3 In other words, the FSIA might confer jurisdiction on the
courts in situations in which the courts still would abstain because of
the act of state doctrine.
Several cases discussed previously illustrate the different results
obtainable depending upon whether the nature test or the purpose test
is applied. In Dunhill,235 the interventors repudiated a commercial
debt. Although the nature of that act arguably was in furtherance of
their governmental mandate to operate the state owned enterprise, the
purpose of their act was simply to repudiate a purely commercial obli-
gation of one of Cuba's commercial instrumentalities.236 Similarly, in
Clayco, the sovereign's act of granting an oil concession might have
been considered commercial in nature because the ultimate outcome
of granting the concession was the achievement of profits, but the pur-
pose of granting the concession was the exploitation of important nat-
ural resources through a basic policy determination.237 In OPEC,
although the IAM alleged that the nature of the oil cartel's sovereign
act was price fixing, a commercial activity, the purpose of the cartel's
act was the establishment of terms and conditions for the removal of a
major natural resource.238
VI. RELIANCE ON EXECUTIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS
It is not greatly disputed that the act of state doctrine should not
229. Id. at 1356 n.4.
230. See id. at 1357 n.6.
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
233. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1357 n.6.
234. Id.
235. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1975); see supra
notes 175-202 and accompanying text.
236. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695.
237. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1984).
238. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1358.
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be applied to thwart legitimate regulatory goals of the United States
in the absence of a showing that adjudication of a dispute will hinder
foreign affairs.2 19 In Environmental Tectonics,24 ° adjudication of the
dispute was proper because the federal government's interest in
enforcing its laws against bribery was established 241 while the degree
of judicial scrutiny necessary for a determination on the merits did
not intrude enough upon United States foreign policy interests to war-
rant dismissal on act of state grounds.
In other cases, the extent of the government's foreign policy
interest may be more problematic, given constitutional mandates.
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers contemplates that
the different branches of government act within "a framework ulti-
mately supervised by a disinterested judiciary. 2 42 This principle is
violated when the judiciary purports to rely on executive pronounce-
ments2 4 in assessing the applicability of the act of state doctrine.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,244 the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the act of state doctrine is applicable only
when the Executive expressly states that it does not wish the court to
hear the case.245 It opined that such a presumption would detrimen-
tally affect United States diplomacy because often the State Depart-
ment may wish to refrain from taking an official position on the
matter.246 In addition, if the Executive had to determine whether it
wished the court to hear a particular case, its decision most likely
would be based on what it thought the outcome of the case would
be. 24 7 The court considered it "highly questionable" whether adjudi-
cation should hinge on the Executive's educated guess as to the out-
come and noted that if the Executive's guess were to be incorrect,
embarrassment to the Executive in its dealings with other countries
might result.248
In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,249 Banco
Nacional, a Cuban bank, brought an action against First National
239. Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 1982).
240. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988),
petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 87-2066); see supra notes
84-104 and accompanying text.
241. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
242. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-1, at 15 (1978).
243. The Bernstein Letter is an example of an executive pronouncement. See supra note 89
and accompanying text.
244. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).




249. 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (plurality opinion).
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City Bank, an American bank, seeking to recover proceeds that
resulted from First National's sale of collateral securing a loan.25 °
First National sold the collateral after the Cuban government seized
the American bank's assets located in Cuba.25" ' First National real-
ized $1.8 million in excess of the debt owed by the Cuban bank to
First National.252 The Cuban bank brought an action to recover the
excess. First National, by way of set-off and counterclaim, sought to
recover damages caused by the expropriation of its property in
Cuba.2" The United States Supreme Court held that the act of state
doctrine did not bar adjudication of the dispute.
25 4 Three Justices255
relied on a letter from the State Department that opined that the act
of state doctrine should not be applied to bar consideration of a
defendant's counterclaim or set-off against the Government of
Cuba.2 56 Justice Rehnquist stated that the doctrine "justifies its exist-
ence primarily on the basis that judicial review of acts of state could
embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of
the government. 2 57 He concluded that when the Executive Branch
expressly states that application of the doctrine would not advance
American foreign policy goals, the doctrine should not be invoked by
the courts. 25 I The other six Justices, including the two concurring
Justices, 219 rejected the so called Bernstein exception.2 °
Justice Brennan's dissent 26' strongly objected to Justice Rehn-




254. Id. at 770.
255. Id. at 760. Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice White.
256. Id. at 762.
257. Id. at 765.
258. Id. at 768; see, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052,
1061 (3d Cir. 1988) (placing emphasis on a letter from the State Department advocating
adjudication), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 17, 1988) (No. 87-2066);
Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d
422, 424 (6th Cir. 1984) (relying in part on a joint amicus brief from the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Justice, urging that the doctrine was inapplicable where a treaty covered the
subject of the litigation). But see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(The Supreme Court refused to rely solely on Executive pronouncements in making its
determination.).
259. Justices Douglas and Powell each filed an opinion concurring in the result. 406 U.S. at
770 (Douglas, J., concurring); Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Stewart, Marshall, and Blackman joined. Id. at 776. (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and
Blackman, J., dissenting).
260. See supra note 89.
261. First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 776-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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quist's position on the purposes of the doctrine.262 Justice Brennan
expressed the view that reliance on Executive pronouncements abdi-
cates the courts' role in enforcing separation of powers and allows
politics, not law, to dictate judicial results.263 Justice Brennan con-
tended that Sabbatino held that in certain circumstances the validity
of a foreign act of state is a political question2 64 and that embarrass-
ment to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs is only one of
the factors the courts look at in determining whether a political ques-
tion is raised.265
The act of state doctrine deals with the competency of the court
to adjudicate a dispute.266  "Its continued vitality depends on its
capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the
judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing
upon foreign affairs."' 2 67 It stands to reason that the courts should not
rely solely on executive pronouncements in deciding whether the doc-
trine applies. In OPEC,268 for example, an executive pronouncement
calling for adjudication of the dispute would not have affected the
outcome because the court did not base its decision on whether or not
the Executive would be embarrassed by the litigation.269 Its decision
was based on several factors: the lack of consensus in international
law concerning the legality of cartels,27 ° the foreign relations tensions
that could be generated by an adjudication on the merits,2" 1 the lack
of any judicially manageable standard with which to decide the
262. Id. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 790-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The classic formulation of the political question
doctrine is as follows:
Prominently found on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1982).
265. First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 788 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
266. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1963).
267. Id. at 428-29.
268. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1163 (1982); see supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1361.
271 Id.
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case, 272 and the affront to sovereignty that would have resulted if a
United States court had attempted to dictate to the OPEC countries
how they should allocate and profit from their natural resources.273
Reliance on executive pronouncements threatens to undermine the
integrity and independence of the judiciary, just as reliance upon the
Executive's determinations that change with the shifting political
winds threatens the equitable principle of treating like cases alike.
VII. CONCLUSION
The act of state doctrine has been criticized by scholars and com-
mentators because of the inconsistent results it allegedly produces.274
This Comment has attempted to dispel that common misperception.
However, the nature and purpose of the doctrine mandate that each
case must be decided in light of particularly sensitive attention to its
unique facts. The doctrine imposes self-restraint on the courts when-
ever a foreign sovereign's policy acts are called into question by the
litigants. If inconsistency appears to exist, it is because, on detailed
examination, cases that may appear to be facially similar will impli-
cate vastly different national concerns of the foreign sovereigns, and
as a result, vastly different foreign policy interests of the United
States. The constitutional separation of powers in our government
requires application of the doctrine whenever the judiciary is not the
proper forum to resolve the dispute because adjudication would inter-
fere with foreign policy goals of the United States.
Commentators should reconsider their criticism of the doctrine
in light of the Sabbatino mandate, which called for analysis of rele-
vant considerations to be identified on a case by case basis before
determining whether the doctrine bars adjudication. The factors that
seem to be determinative include: (1) the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law,27 5 (2) the
importance of the issue to United States foreign relations,276 (3) the
characterization of the sovereign's act as either "ministerial" or
"executive",277 (4) the intrusiveness of reviewing the sovereigns moti-
vation,2 78 and (5) the commercial nature of the activity. 279 No one
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1360-61.
274. Bazyler, supra note 7; Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices: Creating an Exception to
the Act of State Doctrine, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 202 (1984).
275. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 105-24 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 125-65 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
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factor is determinative, nor is the cumulation of these factors impor-
tant. Instead, their significance lies in their tendency to illuminate the
political sensitivities underlying the litigation. Once the political sen-
sitivities of a case are unearthed, the court can decide whether the
judiciary is the appropriate forum in which to resolve the dispute or
whether adjudication would interfere with the Executive's foreign pol-
icy duties. The more politically sensitive the case, the less likely it is
that judicial intervention is desirable. In other cases, when more
objective non-political standards are available to assist the judiciary in
making its determination, adjudication is proper.
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